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The scope of property: why does Kant reject the concept of 
intellectual property?
Abstract
Although  both  Fichte  and  Kant  are  often  included  among  the  intellectual 
property forerunners, there are at least three outstanding differences between 
the former and the latter:
1. Fichte bases copyright on the individual originality in the form of expression; 
Kant does not mention originality at all; 
2.  Fichte  equates  copyright  with  private  property;  Kant  rejects  the  very 
possibility of founding the authors' right on a ius reale;
3. Fichte believes that copyright violators deserve the same harsh punishment 
of  thieves.  According  to  Kant,  the  unauthorized  printer  should  simply 
compensate  all  the  damages  he  caused to  the  author  or  to  his  authorized 
publisher.
While  Fichte  is  an  intellectual  property  endorser,  Kant  is  an  “enlightened” 
conservative  who  supports  the  Roman  law  tradition,  according  to  which 
property applies only to material, touchable things (res quae tangi possunt). He 
accepts  the  copyright  principle,  according  to  which  authors  are  entitled  to 
decide how to publish their works, but describes it as rights concerning only the 
relationships  among  persons.  The  rights  of  the  publishers,  besides,   are 
justified only as long as they help authors to reach the public. 
Kant's copyright is not property; it has the function to protect authors' freedom 
to share their texts as they prefer, and to make it  easier to communicate them 
to the public. And, if it has to be seen as a means to foster the publication and 
the diffusion of  texts,  its  rules should also depend on the prevailing media 
technology.
Kant mantained almost  the same copyright theory both in his 1785 essay Von 
der Unrechtmäßigkeit des Büchernachdrucks and in the Metaphysik der Sitten 
(1797). In 1797, however, Kant bases property on a possessio noumenon that 
is  different,  as a juridical,  rational possession, from the physical possession. 
Why  does  Kant  reject  the  very  concept  of  an  intellectual  property  while 
advocating an intellectual theory of property? Answering to such a question 
could help us the provide a general understanding of the functions and the 
limits of property in Kant's thought. 
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2. Kant: authors right as a personal right
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1. Introduction
Just as I  was writing this paper, on the 9th August 2008,  The Pirate Bay, a 
major Swedish torrent site, was blocked in Italy after an urgent decree from a 
deputy public prosecutor. Although the blockade that should make the Pirate 
Bay's IPs and  domain name inaccessible to Italian users is not very effective, it 
is  prima facie legal.  A recent Italian statute allows to order internet service 
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providers to block all the sites that do not comply with Italian laws. 
The Pirate Bay reacted by stating that Italy is  a country that has  a fascist 
background, a fascist leader and a fascist censorship. 
Some  of  the  torrents2 hosted  by  The  Pirate  Bay  do  point  to  copyrighted 
materials that are shared among its users without being actually present on the 
site. However, some other torrents point, for instance, to documents on Silvio 
Berlusconi that, in Italy, are hardly able to reach the mainstream media.
If  we  conceive  copyright  as  intellectual  property,  any  attempt  to  justify  its 
infringement by appealing to freedom of speech would appear specious, even 
when copyright is de facto used to exert censorship. Kant, however, produced a 
justification of authors' right that does not rely on intellectual property, but on 
the meaning and the function of both authors and publishers in the public use 
of reason. Old and neglected as it may seem, such a theory links economic and 
political  justice  in  an  original,  refreshing  way  that  can  help  us  to  find  a 
mediation between them. 
2. Kant: authors right as a personal right
In 1785 Immanuel Kant wrote a short essay,  Von der Unrechtmäßigkeit des 
Büchernachdrucks,  which  is  sometimes  translated  as  Of  the  injustice  of 
counterfeiting books;3 almost the same ideas are repeated in the Rechtslehre, § 
31, II, contained in Die Metaphysik der Sitten (1797).  As most scholars, in the 
field  of  humanities,  take  intellectual  property  for  granted,  the  mistaken 
representation  of  Kant  like  an  intellectual  property  forerunner  is  still  a 
commonplace.4 
In Kant's age, the word Nachdruck,5 sometimes translated as “counterfeiting” o 
“piracy”, had the proper and less criminal meaning of "reprinting". The United 
Kingdom had passed in 1710 the first European copyright bill, the Statute of 
Anne,6 which  received  a  definitive  interpretation  only  in  1774,  in  the  well-
known judgment on Donaldson vs. Beckett7 settled by the House of Lords. In 
Germany,  on  the  contrary,  the  continuation  of  the  early  modern  privilege8 
2 The torrents contain only the metadata and the tracker that help users to share a file among 
them,  by  means  of  dedicated  applications  (Azureus,  Ktorremt  etc.)  that  run  on  theirs 
computers.
3 The  Cambridge  University  site  Primary  Sources  on  copyright  (1450-1900) 
<http://www.copyrighthistory.org/htdocs/index.html> translates it, more accurately, as "On 
the Injustice of Reprinting Books".
4 See for instance M. Borghi,  Writing Practices in the Privilege - and Intellectual Property -  
Systems,  Social  Science  Research  Network  Working  Paper  Series,  2003 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1031639>.  
5 Check  its  definition  <http://germazope.uni-
trier.de/Projects/WBB/woerterbuecher/dwb/wbgui?lemid=GN00274>  in  J.  Grimm  and  W. 
Grimm. Deutsches Wörterbuch, Lepzig: S. Hirzel, 1854-1960 , now at <http://germa83.uni-
trier.de/DWB/welcome.htm>.
6 The Statute copyright  was no longer a grant  from the crown:  it  was recognized as  an 
original right of the author. It was limited in time, with a 21 years term for all works already 
in  print  at  the  time  of  its  enactment  and  a  14  years  term  for  all  works  published 
subsequently.
7 See  Donaldson v. Beckett. Proceedings in the Lords on the Question of Literary Property, 
February 4 through February 22, 1774, in K.-E, Tallmo,  The History of Copyright: A Critical  
Overview  With  Source  Texts  in  Five  Languages at 
<http://www.copyrighthistory.com/donaldson.html>
8 The major difference between copyright and privilege is that the former is a universal right, 
while the latter depends on a grant from the Crown. The former, in other words, is due to 
regime and the multitude of states and jurisdictions facilitated the practice of 
the Nachdruck by further printers after the first publication. And it was highly 
controversial  whether such a practice were rightful  or should be considered 
piracy.
The debate on the Nachdruck was not restricted to publishers and lawyers: as 
the  Enlightenment  intellectuals  were  aware  of  the  political  importance  of 
disseminating  knowledge,  major  thinkers  like  Lessing,  Kant,  Fichte,  Diderot, 
Condorcet  took  part  to  it.  Kant's  ideas,  in  particular,  are  worth  of  a  closer 
scrutiny because he, while arguing against the Nachdruck, rejects the concept 
of intellectual property, and recognizes some rights to the public in general. 
And  nobody  of  them  used  to  take  for  granted  the  concept  of  intellectual 
property, even because of the strong European Roman Law tradition, according
to which  property is only possible on material, touchable things – the so-called 
res  quae  tangi  possunt.9 The  res  quae  tangi  possunt are  excludable  and 
rivalrous; therefore they present us with the question of who is entitled to use 
them. On the other hand, the incorporeal, spiritual things do not need private 
property because they can be indefinitely shared among everyone.
Kant closes his 1785 essay by asserting his endorsement to the Roman Law 
tradition: 
If the idea of the publication of books in general, built upon here, were well-
prepared, and (as I flatter myself it is possible) elaborated with the elegance 
requisite  to  the  Roman juridical  learning:  then  the  complaint  against  the 
counterfeiter might well be brought before a court, without first needing to 
ask on that account for a new law.10
If Kant's statement has to be taken seriously, Kant should not be considered as 
an  intellectual  property  forerunner.  However,  he  reshapes  the  Roman  Law 
tradition  in  an  original  way,  which  anticipates  the  continental  concept  of 
authors' moral rights.
According to Kant, a book can be seen: 
- as a material object (1) 
- as a means of conveying thoughts (2) 
- as a speech (3)
1. The book as a material object may be reprinted. It becomes a property of 
whoever buys it.  For  the very principle  of  private property,  it  is  not  fair  to 
restrain the ways in which its legitimate purchaser may use it.11 
2.  The  Nachdruck, on the other hand, does not prevent anyone to keep on 
conceiving his thoughts. They remain a "property" of their author, regardless of 
their  reproduction,  because they are  not  material:  properly  speaking,  ideas 
cannot be stolen. 12
3. A speech is an action (Handlung)13. A person who is speaking to a public is 
not  selling  anything  to  them:  he  is  engaging  a  relationship  with  them. 
every author, while the latter derives from a decision of the political power.
9 In the “battle of the booksellers” that raged in England for more than half a century, Roman 
Law  tradition  was  an  important  landmark.  While  the  English  booksellers  argued  that 
copyright  was  a  common  law  property,  therefore  unlimited  and  perpetual,  the  Scottish 
booksellers recognized only the Statute of Anne terms ( 21 years  for all works already in 
print at the time of its enactment and 14 years for all works published subsequently),  on 
the basis of the Scottish Roman Law tradition that denied the very possibility of property on 
immaterial objects.
10 I Kant, Von der Unrechtmäßigkeit des Büchernachdrucks, Ak VIII, 87.
11 I Kant, Von der Unrechtmäßigkeit des Büchernachdrucks, AK VIII 79.
12 Ibidem, Ak VIII 79.
13 Ibidem, Ak VIII 85-86.
Therefore, such a relation is not a matter of rights on things (iura realia), but of 
personal rights (iura personalia).
In the Metaphysik der Sitten, we can find a clear distinction between ius reale 
and  ius personale.  The ius reale  or  ius in re is a right on things.14 The  ius 
personale is  defined as the "possession of  another's choice [Willkür],  in the 
sense of my capacity to determine it by my own choice to a certain deed”.15 In 
other words, it is a right entitling someone to obtain acts from other persons. 
As moral subjectivity involves freedom, personal rights cannot be established 
without the concerned persons' consent. 
According  to  Kant,  the  ius  reale cannot  be  applied  to  ideas,  or,  better,  to 
thoughts.  because  they  can  be  conceived  by  everyone  at  the  same  time, 
without  depriving  their  authors.  Surprising  as  it  may  seem,  the   ius  reale 
protects  the  freedom to  copy,  if  it  is  taken seriously.   If  a  thing  has  been 
purchased  in  a  legal  transaction  and  the  purchasers  copy  it  by  their  own 
means, they are simply working on their legitimate private property.  For the 
very principle of private property, it is not fair to restrain the ways in which its 
legitimate purchaser may use it. 
For this reason, no ius reale can be opposed to the reprinter. If we see the book 
as a material thing, whoever buys it has the right to reproduce it: after all, it is 
his  book.  Furthermore,  in  Kant's  opinion,  we  cannot  derive  any  affirmative 
personal obligation from a ius reale:16 a ius personale on someone cannot be 
claimed by simply purchasing some related things without obtaining his or her 
expressed consent.
Kant, by conceiving the book as an action, adopts a strategy based on the ius 
personale  only. By using such a strategy, he concludes that the unauthorized 
printer  has  to compared to  an unauthorized spokesperson rather  than to  a 
thief. Therefore, it is not necessary to go beyond the Roman law tradition, by 
inventing a new ius reale on immaterial things.
Kant's  argument  goes  as  follows:  when  I  speak  to  a  public,  I  engage  a 
relationship with them.  The book may be viewed as a medium through which 
authors can transmit their speeches to a wider public. In the age of printing, 
such a  medium used to be provided by publishers.  Thus publishers  can be 
considered as spokespersons who speak in the name of the authors. But, as 
such, they need the authors' authorization.17 Why? Because to speak in the 
name of another without his authorization is like engaging him in a relationship 
without his consent. As personal rights. according to Kant, concern relations 
among free beings, they can arise only from expressed agreements.  Hence, 
the unauthorized printer is like an unauthorized spokesperson, who produces a 
relation of the author with the public without being entitled to do it.
However, the scope of Kant's justification of copyright is very narrow: it applies 
only to the publishing of  texts, it does not touch th so-called derivative works, 
and it is justified only as far as it helps the public to get the texts.
Kant does not recognize works of art as speeches. He calls works of art Werke 
or opera, i.e. things that are produced, while indicating books as Handlungen or 
operae, i.e. actions. As the works of art are simply physical objects, we can 
derive from Kant's assumption that every legitimate purchaser may reproduce 
them and may donate or sell the copies to others.18 Every time an object can 
14 I. Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten,  §11, Ak VI 260. The English translations from the Metaphysik der Sitten 
are by M. Gregor: I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 1996. 
15 Ibidem,  §18, A 271
16 I Kant, Von der Unrechtmäßigkeit des Büchernachdrucks, Ak VIII 83.
17 Ibidem, Ak VIII 79-82.
18 Ibidem, Ak VIII 85-86.
be treated only as a product, its legitimate owner may do what he wants with 
it,  because of  his ius reale, which has to be taken seriously on both sides. 
Moreover, as the injustice of reprinting books depends on their communication 
to the public, we can deduce that their reproduction for personal use is not to 
be forbidden.
As  regards  as   the  derivative  works,  Kant  states  that,  if  one  shortens, 
augments,  retouches or translates the book of  another,  he produces a new 
speech, although the thoughts can be the same  Therefore, such works cannot 
be seen as Nachdruck and are perfectly lawful.19 In other words,  in a Kantian 
environment, everyone may become a “wreader” - a reader and writer at the 
same time - without being hindered by copyright restrictions
The goal of the transaction between the author and the publisher is conveying 
his text to the public. The public has a right to interact with the author, if the 
latter has chosen to do it. According to Kant, the publisher may neither refuse 
to publish – or to hand over to another publisher, if he does not want to do it 
himself – a text of a dead author, nor release mutilated or spurious works, nor 
print only a limited impression that does not meet the demand.  If the publisher 
does not comply, the public has the right to force him to publish.20 In other 
words,  in a Kantian environment the publisher's rights are justified only when 
they help authors to reach the public. Copyright should be neither censorship 
nor monopoly.
In the 1785 essay Kant stated that the mandate of an author to a publisher 
should be exclusive21 because the publisher becomes willing to publish a book 
only if he is certain to earn something from it; therefore, he is interested in 
avoiding competition.  But later, in the Metaphysik der Sitten,  Kant does not 
mention the exclusivity requirement at all,  perhaps because he has realized 
that it  was based on an empirical  contamination,  depending on the current 
state of technology. 
In Kant's world the press used to be the medium that provided for the widest 
distribution  of  ideas.  Printing  required  both  specific  tools  and  skills,  and 
specialized  and centralized  organizations.  And  as  long  as  the  publishers  of 
printed texts provided the only medium to convey speeches to a wide public, 
Kant was inclined to bow to their interest. 
However, from a conceptual perspective, there is no reason to deny that an 
author  should  be  entitled  to  authorize  everyone  to  distribute  his  work  to 
everyone else, just like a person may hire more than one spokesperson. Such a 
practice is now fairly usual on the Internet, when authors choose a  Creative 
Commons  License  and  grant  the  right  to  publish  their  works  to  everyone, 
because they are interested in the widest possible spreading of their ideas. In 
Kant's  times  such  a  strategy  would  not  be  paying  because  the  major 
publication  technology,  the  press,  was  not  cheap  and  easy  like  the  digital 
reproduction of texts, but difficult and expensive. 
In  other  words,  Kant's  thesis  is  based  on  the  technical  assumption  that 
publishing requires an intermediation - just as it used to be in the age of print - 
and such intermediation is lawful only it has the author's consent. Where the 
intermediation is not necessary any longer, where no one is speaking in the 
name of another, copyright makes no sense.22
19 Ibidem, Ak VIII 86-87.
20 Ibidem, Ak VIII 85.
21 Ibidem, Ak VIII 81.
22 In a Kantian environment, The Pirate Bay, as it is only facilitating people to copy materials 
for their personal use, should not be seen as a "pirate" Nachdrucker.
3. A term of comparison: Fichte's theory of intellectual property
In 1793 the “Berlinische Monatschrift” published a short essay,  Proof of the 
Illegality of Reprinting: A Rationale and a Parable,23 written by Fichte two years 
ago. The essay connects originality to intellectual property and advocates the 
enforcing of the latter by means of criminal sanctions. It is worth mentioning 
the final  parable by means of  which Fichte illustrates his  thesis,  because it 
contains in itself all our commonplaces on intellectual property.
In  the time of  the Caliph  Harun al  Rashid,  an alchemist  used to  prepare  a 
beneficial  drug  and  to  entrust  the  commercial  side  of  the  business  to  a 
merchant who was the sole distributor throughout the land and who earned a 
goodly profit by his monopoly. Another medicine merchant stole the drug from 
the  monopolist and started to sell it at a cheaper price. The latter brought him 
before the Caliph. The former pleaded for his case by arguing that his selling 
the drug for a cheaper price was useful to the sick persons and to the society 
at  large.  What  was  the  judgment  of  the  Caliph?  “He  had  the  useful  man 
hanged.”24  
To be accurate, the medicine merchant of the parable had not copied the drug, 
but had materially stolen it.  Fichte suggested that copying is like stealing. In 
the  18th century,  however,  Fichte  had  to  demonstrate  the  commonplace  of 
today.
According to Fichte, we can distinguish two aspects of a book:
- its physical aspect (das körperliche), i.e. the printed paper
- its ideational aspect (das geistige)
The ideational aspect of a book is in turn divisible into:
- a material aspect, i.e. the ideas the book presents; 
- the form of these ideas, i. e. the way  in which they are presented.
All the aspects of a book, except one, can be appropriated by anybody: we can 
buy the printed paper and assimilate the ideas it conveys. We cannot, however, 
appropriate its form, because it is strictly personal. And, according to Fichte, it 
is self-evident that "we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of 
which by another is physically impossible".25 As the form can be only mine, the 
author  is  the  proprietor  of  his  text  and  his  authorized  publisher  is  its 
usufructuary.
However sophistical this shift from originality to property may seem, it is not 
the  only  seminal  element  of  our  commonplaces  on  copyright  contained  in 
Fichte's essay. It is also worth remarking that in the Harun al Rashid parable the 
alchemist - the author -  transfer his rights and disappears from the scene; the 
most powerful interests are these of a monopolist - the publisher -; only the 
other medicine merchant - the pirate - pleads for the interests of the public, but 
his  arguments  are  rejected  as  criminal;  as  regards  as  the  Caliph  -  the 
government -, he bows to the monopolist's interests without saying a word; 
and, last but not least, the criminal sanction for piracy - capital punishment - is 
23An  English  translation  by  Martha  Woodmansee  can  be  downloaded  at  the  URL 
<http://www.case.edu/affil/sce/authorship/Fichte,_Proof.doc>
24 J.G. Fichte, Beweis, p. 482.
25  J.G. Fichte, Beweis, pp. 446 ff.
out of all proportion. 
The young Fichte believed that his ideas on authors' right were similar to the 
ones  of  Kant26 However,  there  are  at  least  three  outstanding  differences 
between Kant and Fichte:
1.  Fichte  bases  copyright  on  the  individual  originality  in  the  form  of 
expression;27 Kant does not mention originality at all; 
2.  Fichte  equates  copyright  with  private  property;28 Kant  rejects  the  very 
possibility of founding the authors' right on a ius reale;
3. Fichte thinks that copyright violators deserve the same harsh punishment of 
thieves.29 According  to  Kant,  the  unauthorized  printer  should  simply 
compensate  all  the  damages  he  caused to  the  author  or  to  his  authorized 
publisher.30
While  Fichte  is  an intellectual  property  endorser,   Kant  is  an  “enlightened” 
conservative who supports the Roman law tradition, against the propertization 
trend.  He  accepts  the  copyright  principle,  according  to  which  authors  are 
entitled to decide how to  publish their  works.  The rights  of  the publishers, 
however,  are justified only as long as they help authors to reach the public, 
while the personal use of the texts and the so-called “wreading” should remain 
free.  And, above all,  all  that can be viewed as a product is,  in his  opinion, 
outside the scope of copyright and may be copied without restrictions.
What is, in any, the philosophical meaning of Kant's "conservatism"? To answer 
such a question,  we need to link his  ideas on authors'  right  to his  general 
theory of property, as it is explained in the Metaphysics of Morals.  
4. What is a thing?
In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seems to take for granted that the objects of 
real rights  are only corporeal entities or  res corporales: "Sache ist ein Ding, 
was keiner Zurechnung fähig ist. Ein jedes Object der freien Willkür, welches 
selbst  der  Freiheit  ermangelt,  heiß  daher  Sache  (res  corporalis)".31 
Theoretically, however, such a negative definition could have been appropriate 
to incorporeal things as well.  
According to Kant, the rightful possession of a thing should be distinguished 
from  its  sensible  possession.  Something  external  would  be  rightfully  mine 
"only if I may assume that i could be wronged by another's use of a thing even 
though I am not in possession of it" (Ak, VI 245). The rightful possession is an 
intelligible, not sensible, relation.  I can claim that my bicycle is mine only if I 
am entitled to require that nobody takes it even when I leave it alone in the 
backyard. 
Kant's theory of property is very different from Fichte's principle of property  as 
explained in his 1793 essay,  according to which we are the rightful owners of a 
thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible. For this 
26 J.G. Fichte, Beweis, ftn. 1. According to Fichte Kant did not intend the opera as an action, but 
as something determined by the author's spiritual form.  
27 Ibidem, p. 1.
28 Ibidem, p. 1.
29 Ibidem, pp. 8-10.
30 I. Kant, Über den Gemeinspruch Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die 
Praxis, Ak VIII 80.
31 "A thing is that to which nothing can be imputed. Any object of free choice which itself lacks 
freedom is therefore called a thing (res corporalis)" (AK, VI, 223). 
reason, according to Fichte, the originality of the exposition entitles an author 
to claim a rightful property on his work. 
Is  it  really  so  obvious  that  originality  implies  property?  Property  is  a 
comfortable social convention that allows us to avoid to quarrel all  the time 
over  the  use  of  material  objects.  It  is  so  comfortable  just  because  it  is 
physically possible to appropriate things; we do not need to invoke property 
when something cannot  be separated from someone.   I  say both  that  my 
fingerprints or my writing style are "mine" and that my bicycle is "mine". But 
these  two  "mine"  have  a  different  meaning:  the  former  is  the  "mine"  of 
attribution; the latter is the "mine" of property.  The former can be used to 
identify someone; and conveys the historical circumstance that something is 
related exclusively to someone, the latter points only to an accidental relation 
with an external thing, if we consider it from a physical point of view. On a 
historical  circumstance  it  is  possible  to  lie,  by  plagiarizing  a  text,  i.e.  by 
attributing it to a person who did not wrote it. However, properly speaking, no 
one can steal it: the convention of property is useless, in this case. Besides, if 
Fichte's  principle  were  the  only  justification  of  property  right,  it  would 
undermine the very concept of it: as it is physically possible to "attribute" my 
bicycle to another, when I leave it alone in the backyard, everyone would be 
entitled to take it for himself. As Kant would have said, a legal property right 
cannot be founded on sensible situations, but only on intelligible relations.  
Although  he  defines  things  as  res  corporales,  Kant  determines  the  rightful 
possession  of  a  thing  as  a  possession  without  detentio,  by  ignoring  all  its 
sensible facets.  Such a possession - a possession of a thing without holding it - 
is  exerted on an object that  is "merely distinct from me", regardless of its 
position  in  space  and  time.  Space  and  time,  indeed,  are  sensible 
determinations  and  should  be  left  out  of  consideration.  According  to  the 
postulate of practical reason with regard to rights, property is justified by a 
permissive law of  reason: if  a rightful  possession were not possible,   every 
object would be a  res nullius and nobody would be entitled to use it.
Kant implicitly denies that a res nullius can be used by everyone at the same 
time. His tacit assumption suggests that the objects of property, besides being 
distinct from the subjects, are excludable and rivalrous as well, just like the res 
corporales-
Kant asserts that something external is mine if I would be wronged by being 
disturbed in my use of it even though I am not in possession of it (Ak VI, 249). If 
property is a merely intelligible relation with an object that is simply distinct 
from the subject,  we have no reason to deny that such an object might be 
immaterial as well, just like the objects of intellectual property.
Kant,  as  we  have  seen,  does  not  use  the  concept  of  intellectual  property. 
According to him, a speech is an action of a person: it belongs to the realm of 
personal  rights.  A  person  who  is  speaking  to  the  people  is  engaging  a 
relationship  with  them;  if  someone else  engages  such a  relationship  in  his 
name, he needs his authorization. The reprinter, as it were, does not play with 
property: he is only an agent without authority.  Speeches, by Kant, cannot be 
separated from persons: he has seen the unholy promised  land of intellectual 
property without entering it. Why? 
According to Kant, before the acquired rights,  everyone has a moral capacity 
for putting others under obligation  that he calls innate right or internal  meum 
vel tuum  (AK, VI, 237). The innate right is only one: freedom as independence 
from being constrained  by  another's  choice,  insofar  it  can coexist  with  the 
freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law. 
Freedom belongs to every human being by virtue of  his  humanity:  in other 
words, it has to be assumed before every civil constitution, because it is the 
very  possibility  condition  of  law.  Freedom  implies  innate  equality,  "that  is, 
independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind 
them; hence a human being's quality of being his own master (sui iuris), as well 
as being a human being beyond reproach (iusti) since before he performs  any 
act affecting rights  he has done no wrong to anyone,  and finally  his  being 
authorized to do to others anything that does not in itself  diminish what is 
theirs,  so  long  as  they  do  not  want  to  accept  it  -  such  things  as  merely 
communicating his thoughts to them." (AK VI, 237-238)32
In spite of his intellectual theory of property,33 Kant does not enter in the realm 
of intellectual property for a strong systematic reason. Liberty of speech is an 
important part of the innate right of freedom. It cannot be suppressed without 
suppressing freedom itself.  If the ius reale were applied to speeches, a basic 
element of freedom would be reduced to an alienable thing, making it easy to 
mix copyright protection and censorship. 
Property rights are based on the assumption that its objects are excludable and 
rivalrous and need to be appropriated by someone to be used.  We cannot, 
however, deal with speeches as they were excludable and rivalrous things that 
need to be appropriated to be of some use, because excluding people from 
speeches would be like excluding them from freedom.
Therefore, Kant binds speeches to the persons and their actions, and limits the 
scope of  copyright to publishing,  or,  better,  to the publishing of  the age of 
print: the  Nachdruck is unjust only when someone reproduces a text without 
the author's  permission and distributes  its  copies to the public.  If  someone 
copies  a  book  for  his  personal  use,  or  lets  others  do  it,  or  translates  and 
elaborates a text, there is no copyright violation, just because it is not involved 
any intrinsic property right, but only the exercise of the innate right of freedom. 
The boundary of Kant's copyright is the public use of reason, as a key element 
of a basic right that should be recognized to everyone.  Kant does not stick to 
the  Roman  Law  tradition  because  of  conservatism,  but  because  of 
Enlightenment. 
32 Italics added.
33See H. Williams, Metaphysical and not just political,  "ECPR general conference" (September 
2007)
